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ASEAN AS A ‘THIN’ COMMUNITY: THE CASE AGAINST 
ADOPTING THE EU ACID RAIN FRAMEWORK FOR 
TRANSBOUNDARY HAZE MANAGEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA1
Transboundary haze is a recurring problem in Southeast Asia. 
Academic discussion has focused largely on the failure of ASEAN 
to promote effective regional cooperation on the issue. On the other 
hand, EU action in the 1980s had been successful in mitigating 
acid rain at the regional level. The two cases are similar - both are 
anthropogenic pollution problems that originated in particular states 
in the region, but which effects were felt more severely in neighbouring 
states. Furthermore, both regions have institutionalised organisations 
in which all concerned states are members. Therefore, scholars 
have often looked towards the European experience with acid rain 
as a potential framework for effective ASEAN action over the haze. 
However, this paper argues that this strategy is misguided. This is 
because, unlike the ‘thick’ EU community with pooled sovereignty 
and sufficient clout to influence regional outcomes, ASEAN is a ‘thin’ 
community which was designed to advance the individual national 
interests of its member states. Therefore, ASEAN-level haze mitigation 
programmes cannot be expected to be effective in the same way 
that acid rain programmes have been in Europe. Thus, this article 
suggests that haze abatement in Southeast Asia should not depend 
solely, or even mainly, on regional action.
Keywords: ASEAN, European Union, community, transboundary pollution, 
acid rain, haze, environmental cooperation, regional cooperation
Introduction
Scholarship on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and Southeast Asia has unsurprisingly encouraged comparative analysis with 
other regional organizations, most often with the European Union (EU). 
Both ASEAN and the EU seem to have substantial similarities: a preference 
for consensus-based outcomes, a love for informal arrangements, durable 
expectations for mutual consultation and responsiveness, and non-instrumental 
1  �he author would li�e to sincerely than� the anonymous reviewer for his�her construc-
tive comments and suggestions. 
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reasons in trying to accommodate each other2. �herefore, it is understandable 
that the literature has seen arguments that ASEAN is developing, or should 
develop, ‘in the footsteps’ of the EU3. For instance, Adler4 states that Southeast 
Asia is in the process of developing a ‘tightly coupled security community’ 
li�e the EU. EU agencies themselves see enough wor�able similarities to 
actively promote and encourage the adoption of regional integration norms in 
Southeast Asia that refer bac� to EU’s own integration experience5. However, 
the employment of the European experience as an archetype for Southeast Asia 
is a problematic aspect of the discourse of regionalism in Southeast Asia6. 
�his is especially so in the case of transboundary pollution in the 
region. In the scholarship on transboundary haze in Southeast Asia, the 
European experience on acid rain is often held up as a parallel example, 
and the EU’s more successful efforts, li�e the Convention on Long Range 
�ransboundary Air Pollution (CLR�AP) within the Clean Air for Europe 
(CAFE) programme are often seen as a benchmar� for ASEAN action over the 
haze. �he physical parallels of the European transboundary acid rain problem 
and the regional haze in Southeast Asia are immediately apparent. Here were 
two anthropogenic pollution problems that originate in particular states in 
the region, but which effects were felt more severely in neighbouring states. 
�hese physical similarities, and Europe’s success in abating acid rain, has led 
to the suggestions that the framewor� should be extended to Southeast Asia in 
addressing the haze issue7, especially since ASEAN has to date been unable 
to effectively mitigate the regional haze. European scholars li�e Brachtl8 even 
helpfully note that since developing countries (li�e most ASEAN countries) are 
less li�ely than their industrialized counterparts to be able to deal effectively 
with transboundary pollution, and are also more li�ely to suffer from the ill 
effects of polluting emissions, they should be encouraged to adopt hence the 
adoption of existing successful models. 
�his paper aims to refute these claims and argues that the successes and 
failures of transboundary haze management in Southeast Asia do not depend 
solely, or even mainly, on regional action. �his paper’s argument is: ASEAN 
cannot be held to blame for the persistence of the haze because ASEAN was 
not designed to be a ‘thic�’ community with pooled sovereignty, and thus 
2  Lewis, J. 2009. ‘�he Impact of Institutional Environment on Negotiation Styles in EU 
Decision Ma�ing.’ Dublin: UCD Dublin European Institute.
3	 	Nair,	“Regionalism	in	the	Asia	Pacific/East	Asia”,	pp.	110-142
4  Adler, E. 1997. ‘Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive regions in International 
Relations.’ Journal of International Studies, 26, 249.
5  Murray, P. 2010. ‘�he European Union as an integration entreprenur in East Asia - 
Yardstic� or cautionary tale?’ Paper presented at Australian Political Studies Association Confer-
ence. 27-29 September.
6	 	Nair,	“Regionalism	in	the	Asia	Pacific/East	Asia”,	pp.	110-142
7	 	Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	Regional	Haze	in	Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
8  Brachtl, “Capitalising on the Success of the Long-Range �ransboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP)	Regime	to	Address	Global	Transboundary	Air	Pollution”,	p.	3
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sufficient	 clout,	 to	 influence	 national	 outcomes	 on	 the	 haze.	Therefore,	 this	
paper argues that scholarly comparisons and suggestions for the ASEAN haze 
regime to evolve in the spirit of the European model for acid rain abatement, 
while	not	wrong,	would	be	insufficient	in	conclusively	mitigating	the	haze	issue	
in the region. Within the EU, as a thic� community, regional level directives 
are easily and willingly absorbed into national practice. On the other hand, 
ASEAN is by design a thin community. �herefore, regional level directives 
can be tainted by dominant national interests. By its very nature, ASEAN is 
not designed to be able to conclusively solve regional problems li�e the haze, 
regardless of wea� or strong mechanisms. 
This	 paper	 is	 divided	 into	 two	 main	 sections.	 The	 first	 section	
discusses the concepts of thic� and thin community in the literature, and details 
the comparative scholarship of these two regions to show that unli�e the ‘thic�’ 
EU community, ASEAN was explicitly designed as a ‘thin’ community with 
limitations on collective action. �he second half of this paper discusses acid 
rain and its management within the EU, and how scholars have tried to export 
this model as suggestions for the transboundary haze problem in ASEAN. It 
then argues that given the nature of the ASEAN ‘thin’ community, scholarly 
focus on regional solutions for haze are misguided. 
Thick and thin community
Ferdinand �onnies9, one of the earliest social philosophers to 
engage with the idea of community, introduced the terms Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft to describe the motives that explain the existence of all �inds of 
collectives, or cause their persistence. He calls all �inds of collectives in which 
natural will predominates as Gemeinschaft, and all those which are formed 
and fundamentally conditioned by rational will as Gesellschaft. �he social 
collective has the characteristics of Gemeinschaft in so far as the members 
thin� of such a grouping as a gift of nature or created by a supernatural will. �he 
example given here is the Indian caste system. Gesellschaft in turn develops 
out of the needs, interests, desires and decisions of persons who previously 
wor�ed cooperatively together and are acting and dealing one with another. 
�he collective here is seen as a means and tool to be used in bettering the 
members’	conditions.	Tonnies	does,	however,	note	that	motives	can	fluctuate	
so that a collective can now be of one category, then of another. 
Herbert10 updates �onnies’ Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft concepts by 
referring to ‘thic�’ and ‘thin’ community. �hic� community, roughly correlating 
with Gemeinschaft, is a repository of values to sustain a group’s moral fabric 
which provide meaning and direction for community members (community 
9  �onnies, F. 1955. ‘Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft.’ In C. P. Loomis (Ed.) Community 
and Association: 3-29. London: Routledge & K. Paul.
10  Herbert, S. 1997. Citizens, Cops and Power. Chicago: �he University of Chicago 
Press.
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as recovered). Here, the goal of community action is to ac�nowledge those 
extant values and reinforce them. In a thic� community, there is a universe of 
possibilities in inherent communal politics (community as discovered), where 
community members come together to create an inclusive and open-ended 
politics by exploring a range of political avenues in a capacious and respectful 
fashion. It is through deliberation that members of the community can come to 
discover or create a common good. �hin community, correlating to Gesellschaft, 
is seen as much looser and more occasional confederations of li�e-minded 
individuals who are capable of coming and going from a range of such possible 
confederations. �herefore, communities sometimes come together, sometimes 
not. Such communities have fewer claims on the moral and political grounding 
of members. Such a community would structure politics in the most general 
way possible, by avoiding the endorsement of a particular moral schema. �his 
will yield procedures that are widely acceptable and commodious and that rely 
upon publicly defensible reasons for their perpetuation. In short, Gesellschaft 
omits the notion of a common identity11. 
While these references to community do not necessarily refer 
to communities of states, these categorizations can, and have been used to 
describe regional state groupings. Palmujo�i12	contextualizes	these	definitions	
within the regionalism literature in terms of old and new; old regionalism is 
characterized by the tendency towards integration, federalism, and diminishing 
national sovereignty while new regionalism is driven by nationalism and 
interdependence13. Quite obviously, the regions of interest to this paper, the 
EU	and	ASEAN	fit	into	different	categorizations.	The	EU	can	be	considered	a	
thic� community in the spirit of old regionalism, while ASEAN is very much 
a thin community14 along the lines of new regionalism, as is discussed in the 
following sections. 
EU’s ‘thick’ community
In Europe, EU institutions play a more important role in controlling the 
union and its development15. A central characteristic of European integration is 
that the concepts of ‘formal sovereignty’ and federalism have burst their original 
legal	boundaries	to	become	ideological	tools	in	the	definition	of	identity	and	
belonging; as a result it has become a more inward-loo�ing community. �he 
coherence	of	European	regionalism	has	been	a	pragmatic	outcome	of	specific	
11	 	Adler,	“Imagined	(Security)	Communities”,	p.	249
12	 	Pallemaerts,	“The	Politics	of	Acid	Rain	Control	in	Europe”,	p.	3
13  Sutherland, C. 2005. ‘Another nation-building bloc? Integrating nationalist ideology 
into the EU and ASEAN.’ Asia Europe Journal, 3, 141-57.
14  Warleigh-Lac�, A. 2009. ‘�he EU in Comparative Perspective: Comparing the EU 
and NAF�A.’ Paper presented at 3rd EUCE Conference. 26-28 April 2009, Emmerson, D. 2005. 
‘Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia.’ 
Paper presented at Southeast Asian Forum.
15	 	Sutherland,	“Another	nation-building	bloc?”,	pp.	141-157,	Nair,	“Regionalism	in	the	
Asia	Pacific/East	Asia”,	pp.	110-142
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historical experiences, one where the role of the Second World War and the 
Cold War was decisive. �his has been complemented by the current dynamics 
of globalization that has further created rationales for deeper inward-loo�ing 
institutionalization. 
�hic� community-building as seen in the EU refers to the social 
construction and institutionalization by means of shared normative structures, 
facilitate the channeling of material resources in the direction of shared 
transnational goals, promote political, economic, and social transactions, 
and play a role in fostering the development of transnational identities and 
the ‘we feeling’. Multilateral communication in this context helps thic�en the 
social environment, building a sense of regional interests, through the close 
identification	of	regional	good	with	the	good	of	individual	states16.�he resulting 
organization	should	matter	to	its	members	emotionally,	in	shared	identification	
with and loyalty to the organization, expressed in a clear and evident sense of 
community17. 
�he EU calls for the development of a strategic culture, which fosters 
early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. National policy choices 
are shaped by collective strategic cultures, which are themselves the result of 
long and diverse historical experiences. EU decisions on institutions, policies 
and capabilities are based on growing ideological and cognitive homogeneity, 
connected to the aspirations of Europeans to accomplish political union18. 
Member states of the EU in fact voiced that being part of the European Union 
has actually made them realize that the European approach is better than what 
was considered as ‘national interest’. Hence, the EU’s institutional contexts 
have different combinations of insulation, scope, interaction intensity, and 
informal norms that support cooperative styles of negotiation by design. For 
example,	 in-camera	 (private)	 settings	 in	 the	EU	are	 specifically	designed	 to	
build ‘thic�’ trust and diffuse reciprocity to promote deliberation based on 
community rules19. �hese elements are mar�edly different in nature from the 
ASEAN type of community, as discussed below. 
ASEAN’s ‘thin’ community
In contrast to the EU, ASEAN cooperation remains (elite and) state-
led20.	ASEAN’s	circumstances	have	led	it	to	concentrate	on	regional	benefits	
to	members’	‘external	sovereignty’;	a	stronger	international	profile	as	part	of	a	
16	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	209
17	 	Emmerson,	“Will	the	Real	ASEAN	Please	Stand	Up?”,	p.	15
18  Christoph, O. M. 2005. ‘Convergence �owards a European Strategic Culture? A Con-
structivist Framewor� for Explaining Changing Norms.’ 11, 523.
19  Lewis, “�he Impact of Institutional Environment on Negotiation Styles in EU Deci-
sion	Making”,	p.	6-21
20	 	Sutherland,	“Another	nation-building	bloc?”,	pp.	141-157,	Nair,	“Regionalism	in	the	
Asia	Pacific/East	Asia”,	pp.	110-142
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larger	regional	grouping,	and	the	boost	to	national	self-confidence	this	brings21. 
�herefore, a state and sovereignty-centered regionalism, steered by regional 
elites, emerged in the Southeast Asian context because it served pragmatic 
ends in the face of decolonization and nation-building, and remained viable in 
pursuing functional tas�s22. Adler23 notes that many contemporary multilateral 
institutional activities that ASEAN often engages in, li�e trade and economic 
regimes, are only indirectly lin�ed to community-building. Instead, they 
respond to the instrumental logic of self-interested states that coordinate their 
policies on the basis of consensual principles of conduct; thus constructing a 
thin version of community.
�he ‘ASEAN Way’ is premised on the principle of non-interference 
and often leads to the thinnest of lowest-common-denominator outcomes. 
Subscribing to this ‘ASEAN Way’ shields national governments from having 
to	commit	to	addressing	joint	tasks	that	governments	either	find	too	demanding	
administratively,	politically	difficult	 if	 these	went	against	dominant	national	
interests,	 or	 not	 sufficiently	 important	 given	 a	 set	 of	 national	 priorities.	 In	
this way, ASEAN is expected to enable member states to pursue its national 
interests with minimal resistance, while ensuring that the regional atmosphere 
is healthy and supportive of this. 
As a result, Lewis24 notes that the underlying purpose and resulting 
institutional design of the two regional groupings is completely different. 
�herefore, scholars li�e Narine25 argue that notions of a ‘thic�ening’ ASEAN 
community are premature. While scholars and policyma�ers often refer 
to Europe as a benchmar�, some ac�nowledge that Europe’s way is not 
directly transferrable to Southeast Asia; thus it is not relevant to the ASEAN 
experience26. Contextual differences, such as ASEAN’s ten-year time lag behind 
the EU, its relative lac� of supranational authority, and lasting memories of 
colonialism further complicate such analysis27. In these ways, many regard the 
EU as too particularistic and ‘advanced’ to constitute a useful comparator with 
ASEAN. Murray quotes Wheatley28 pointing out that Southeast Asia ‘is not 
about	to	set	up	an	Asia	Monetary	Fund	or	sacrifice	its	sacrosanct	principle	of	
non-interference to create the institutional basis for anything that loo�s li�e a 
fledgling	European	Community’.	Thus,	the	increasing	use	of	decision-making	
by	qualified	majority	voting	would	not	easily	find	place	in	ASEAN.	
21	 	Sutherland,	“Another	nation-building	bloc?”,	pp.	141-157
22	 	Nair,	“Regionalism	in	the	Asia	Pacific/East	Asia”,	pp.	110-142
23	 	Adler,	“Imagined	(Security)	Communities”,	p.	249
24  Lewis, “�he Impact of Institutional Environment on Negotiation Styles in EU Deci-
sion	Making”,	p.	6-21
25	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	209
26	 Sutherland,	“Another	nation-building	bloc?”,	pp.	141-157
27  Sutherland, C. 2005. ‘Another nation-building bloc? Integrating nationalist ideology 
into the EU and ASEAN.’ Asia Europe Journal, 3, 141-57. Murray, “�he European Union as an 
integration	entrepreneur	in	East	Asia”,	p.	12
28  Murray,	“The	European	Union	as	an	integration	entrepreneur	in	East	Asia”,	p.	12
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An even looser version of a thin community is the ‘imitation’ 
community. �his term was coined by Oa�enshott29 in the context of ‘imitation 
states’, to describe the incomplete nation building of many newly formed 
countries in the post-colonial world. Along these lines, Kedourie30 argues that 
leaders of imitation states labour under strong feelings of insecurity generated 
by their lac� of legitimacy. As the product of fa�e elections or military coups, 
their power does not rest on the loyalty of whom they rule. Jones and Smith31 
propose that this concept can be translated to the regional community level. 
�hey argue that imitation states also produce ‘imitation communties’ that are 
essentially rhetorical and institutional shells that give form but no substance to 
domestic or regional arrangements.
Jones and Smith propose that ASEAN is not only a thin community, 
but it is a thin imitation community, made up of imitation states. As proof of 
this, they argue that ASEAN suffers from a gap between rhetorical aspiration 
and regional reality. For example, it is committed to regional neutrality and 
yet this non-aligned neutralism requires the semi-detached presence of the 
United States. �hey quote Leifer32 arguing that there is ‘a general, if unstated, 
recognition that the community has neither the sense of common interest nor 
the resources to shape the future pattern of regional order’. �his, however, 
won warm endorsement from ASEAN’s ruling elite because this discourse 
of	multilateralism	was	useful	to	sustain	the	fiction	of	a	harmonious	regional	
community that obscured attention from both existing tensions among ASEAN 
states and the internal divisions within the states. Furthermore, ASEAN 
imitation states are not under democratic pressure to justify their recognition of 
integration’s	benefits	to	its	public,	unlike	the	EU33.  ASEAN possesses all the 
paraphernalia that regional organizations require: media-attended ministerial 
meetings, a secretariat and a troi�a. Yet, it can ma�e no decisions and enforce 
no rules. Based on this, ASEAN is then an imitation community; a convenient 
front for the needs of its members34. �his section will expound the notions 
of community-building used in ASEAN literature, and express how these can 
only be considered ‘imitation communities’, or thin forms of community at 
best. 
It has been argued that the ASEAN Way, which many scholars credit 
for ASEAN’s successes, is not conducive for thic� community-building. �his 
ASEAN Way process enables members to retain a degree of domestic policy 
29  Jones, D. M. & Smith, M. L. R. 2006. ASEAN and East Asian International Relations. 
Glos: Edward Elgar.
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
32  Jones, D. M. & Smith, M. L. R. 2006. ASEAN and East Asian International Relations. 
Glos: Edward Elgar.
33	 	Sutherland,	“Another	nation-building	bloc?”,	pp.	141-157
34	 	Jones	&	Smith,	“ASEAN	and	East	Asian	International	Relations”,	,	pp.	56-72	
Jebat  Volume 38 (2)  (December  2011) Page | 7
ASEAN As A ‘�hin’ Community
autonomy35 while maintaining an illusion of unity36. �he non-interference 
clause has enabled governments to exclude any issue deemed to be politically 
sensitive from ever being discussed at the regional level37. And, if ASEAN 
cannot	 reach	 a	 consensus	 on	 a	 difficult	 issue,	 then	 no	 organizational	 stand	
is ta�en, and members agree to disagree, while enabling the organization 
to	 remain	 unified38. In addition, the ‘ASEAN minus x’ principle enables 
individual member states to go further and faster individually without upsetting 
consensus39. ASEAN also has no central institutions to uphold compliance or 
any credible mechanisms for settling disputes in an objective and binding 
manner40. Deep, or ‘thic�’ integration, coercive rules, and any serious erosion of 
the non-interference principle have been viewed as potentially divisive for the 
organization41. �herefore, while ASEAN leaders often credit the organization 
with maintaining peace in the region, ASEAN can be said to have contributed 
much more to conflict avoidance among its members than conflict resolution42. 
Based on these observations, many scholars argue that Southeast Asian 
states are mostly motivated by narrow understandings of their self-interest; 
hence ASEAN remains an institution driven by the individual interests of its 
members43. In most cases, the nations’ self-interest reinforces a mutual sta�e in 
regional stability44, but the developing economic and security interests of the 
individual ASEAN states could li�ely undermine the organization’s functional 
coherence45. Given each member’s domestic concerns with religious, ethnic 
and other sectarian fault lines, none is expected to be his ‘brother’s �eeper’46. 
ASEAN states will not put considerations of ASEAN unity before their own 
concrete interests, and the support of the member states for the organisation 
remains dependent on the utility of the organization for its members47. 
35	 	Nesadurai,	“The	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations”,	p.	555
36	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	202
37	 	Nesadurai,	“The	Association	of	Southeast	Asian	Nations”,	p.	555
38	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	202
39	 	Smith,	“ASEAN’s	Ninth	Summit”,	p.	426
40  Severino, R. C., Hew, D., Suryadinata, L., Hsu, L. & Moeller, J. O. 2005. Framing the 
ASEAN Charter. Singapore: ISEAS.
41  Ferguson, R. J. 2004. ‘ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional 
“Development”.’	Contemporary Southeast Asia,	26,	393.	Emmerson,	“Challenging	ASEAN”,	p.	
432 
42  Denoon, D. B. H. & Colbert, E. 1998. ‘Challenges for the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN).’ Pacific Affairs, 71:4, 505, Beeson, M. 2002. ‘Southeast Asia and the 
politics of vulnerability.’ Third World Quarterly, 23:3, 549.
43	 	 Narine,	 “ASEAN	 and	 the	 management	 of	 regional	 security”,	 p.	 214,	 Buszynski,	
“ASEAN’s	new	challenges”,	p.	555
44	 	Khoo,	H.	S.	2000.	‘ASEAN	as	a	“neighbourhood	watch	group”.’	Contemporary South-
east Asia, 22:2, 279.
45	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	202
46	 	Khoo,	“ASEAN	as	a	“neighbourhood	watch	group”,	p.	280
47	 	Narine,	“ASEAN	and	the	management	of	regional	security”,	p.	202
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Acid rain mitigation in Europe
�he second part of this article focuses on the experiences of the 
EU and ASEAN in managing transboundary pollution issues respectively, 
beginning with acid rain in the EU. In the 1960s, scientists demonstrated 
the interrelationship between sulphur emissions in continental Europe and 
the	acidification	of	Scandinavian	lakes.	Acid	rain	was	found	to	have	harmful	
effects on ecosystems, infrastructure and human health. 
In response to these acute problems, European policy-ma�ers 
established a regional platform to abate air pollution in Europe, with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) serving as the 
secretariat. As a result, the 1979 CLR�AP was signed early on by all the 34 
European governments, Eastern as well as Western, and the European Economic 
Community (EEC)48. Even though the CLR�AP was presided over by a UN 
body, the EEC acquired jurisdiction over air pollution control policy when it 
became a party to the convention alongside its member states49. �he CLR�AP 
was	the	first	international	legally	binding	instrument	to	deal	with	problems	of	
air pollution on a broad regional basis50. It is regarded by some as a successful 
example of what can be achieved through intergovernmental cooperation on 
transboundary environmental issues51, and has been successful in achieving 
more than 60% reduction in the emissions of sulfur, nitrogen oxides, volatile 
organic compounds, heavy metals, and persistent organic pollutants52. 
When the CLR�AP was created, only two of its 30 members thought 
acid rain was a problem53. However, the broad participation from a European-
wide	scientific	community	in	developing	the	critical	loads	levels	of	pollution	
standards, with each scientist identifying himself as a ‘European’ scientist and 
not from a particular state, diminished concerns that certain states’ interests 
would	be	at	stake.	This	led	to	a	common	acceptance	of	the	scientific	results	
used for further abatement policies54. Further, with the EEC’s leadership, 
negotiations for the CLR�AP moved quic�ly from individually assigning 
blame to collective problem solving55. �he focus was to shift the nature of 
the public debate away from determining who the ‘bad guys’ were, towards 
48  Johannessen, �. 2009. ‘Clean air policy under the UNECE Convention on long-range 
transboundary	air	pollution:	how	are	monitoring	results	“translated”	to	policy	action.’	iForest, 2, 
49-50, Pallemaerts, M. 1988. ‘Law: �he Politics of Acid Rain Control in Europe.’ Environment, 
30:2, 42.
49  Pallemaerts,	“Law”,	p.	43
50  Eaton, P. & Radojevic, R. 2001. Forest Fires and Regional Haze in Southeast Asia. 
New Yor�: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.
51  Sliggers, J. 2004. Clearing the air: 25 Years of the Convention on Long-Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution. United Nations Publications.
52	 	Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	Regional	Haze	in	Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
53  Levy, M. A. 1992. ‘Acid Rain in Europe.’ Environment, 34:4, 16.
54  Johannessen, “Clean air policy under the UNECE Convention on long-range trans-
boundary	air	pollution”,	pp.	49-50
55  Hordij�, L. 1998. ‘�he Lessons of �ransboundary Pollution in Europe.’ Paper pre-
sented at OECD Megascience Forum 4-6 March 1998.
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determining how vulnerable each party was to acid rain; therefore focusing on 
environmental impacts rather than causes56. �he second sulfur protocol under 
the	CLRTAP	was	in	fact	the	first	international	agreement	which	has	an	effects-
based approach57. 
When the EEC evolved into the EU, the CLR�AP ran parallel with, 
and was later integrated into, the EU’s new CAFE programme to integrate 
air pollution policies, that was launched in 199858. �he program’s aims were 
to develop a long-term, strategic and integrated policy to protect against the 
effects of air pollution on human health and the environment59, by integrating 
member states’ policy objectives, harmonising activities, and sharing problem 
and solution frames60. �he expansion of the EU and the internalisation of the 
European Community idea as part of the identity of member states caused two 
complimentary effects on European air pollution policies. First, the stronger 
top-down component characteristic of the supranational EU was able to dictate 
policy to the laggards61. Environmental directives before 1987 generally 
required unanimity, but the 1987 Single European Act allowed limited use 
of	 qualified	 majority	 decisions	 for	 environmental	 policymaking62. Second, 
and	more	significantly,	many	EU	member	countries	began	 to	overlook	 their	
national interests in favour of community perception63. 
Firstly, the integration of the CLR�AP policies into CAFE changed the 
ways in which certain policies were implemented. Earlier, with the CLR�AP, 
all initiatives and decisions were ta�en by the countries themselves. But when 
absorbed into CAFE, instead of the member states, the European Commission 
too� the initiative to carry out CLR�AP initiatives. �he main role of the 
commission within the EU system is to set agendas and initiate policy. It also 
plays a central role in supervising the follow-up of EU legislation, including 
CAFE64. For example, monitoring and inventory efforts within the CLR�AP 
were also on a voluntary basis, but within CAFE, all members are supposed to 
participate and to deliver by a set date. �he CLR�AP wor�ed on consensus, but 
within	CAFE	the	commission	takes	the	decisions,	and	the	final	policy	proposal	
is the responsibility of the commission65. 
56  Levy, M. A. 1995. ‘International Co-operation to Combat Acid Rain.’ In H. O. Berges-
en, G. Parmann & �. O. B (Eds.) Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environ-
ment and Development 1995: 59-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
57  Johannessen, “Clean air policy under the UNECE Convention on long-range trans-
boundary	air	pollution”,	pp.	49-50
58  Wettestad, J. 2002. ‘Clearing the air: Europe tac�les transboundary pollution.’ Envi-
ronment,	44:2,	32.	Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	Regional	Haze	in	Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
59	 	Wettestad,	“Clearing	the	air”,	p.	32
60  �uinstra, W. 2008. ‘European air pollution assessments: co-production of science and 
policy.’ 8, 35.
61  Grennfelt, P. & Hov, O. 2005. ‘Regional Air Pollution at a �urning Point.’ 34, 2.
62	 	Wettestad,	“Clearing	the	air”,	pp.	38-39
63	 	Levy,	“Acid	Rain	in	Europe”,	p.	43
64	 	Wettestad,	“Clearing	the	air”,	pp.	38-39
65	 	Tuinstra,	“European	air	pollution	assessments”, p. 35
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Secondly, the increasing importance that member states placed on 
a	unified	European	identity	meant	 that	states	became	more	conscious	of	 the	
social and environmental consequences of not acting within the prescribed 
norms of the community. �herefore, even though the soft-law provisions of the 
CLR�AP and CAFE were considered too general and wea� (they were vague 
and	subject	to	so	many	qualifications	that	they	do	not	impose	on	contracting	
parties	any	specific	obligations	with	respect	to	air	pollution	policies),	they	still	
managed to serve a vital role in magnifying pressure on
recalcitrant states, in �eeping the consensus-building activities high on 
governments’ agendas, and in assisting domestic environmental allies. �he 
process can be called ‘tote-board diplomacy’, where a collective standard 
(such as the 30% reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions) is held up publicly 
and countries are subject to collective pressure to meet those standards66. Even 
though there was no actual punishment set for non-compliance, this collective 
pressure	was	sufficient	and	in	fact,	several countries began to set even more 
ambitious reduction targets at the national level67. 
Often lowest-common-denominator agreements are criticised 
because they do no more than codify the status quo. However, conditions in 
Europe enabled these agreements to actually advance the status quo68, and 
provided proof that not all ‘toothless agreements’ are destined to remain so69. 
With over two decades of implementation of the CLR�AP, its secretariat 
has developed various strategies to monitor compliance of its members, 
and to exact compliance from erring members. �his included setting up an 
assembly of signatory parties to meet annually to review the implementation 
of the agreement, thus providing the institutional basis for a process of 
regime	 strengthening.	 The	 powerful	 normative	 idea	 of	 a	 unified	 European	
community combined with the EU’s integrated policy-ma�ing machinery has 
resulted	 in	 significant	 successes	 in	 the	matter.	The process observed in this 
case of regional pollution management exhibits both the strategic use of the 
normative environment, and also coercion by policy-ma�ers. While the EU’s 
supranational nature allowed hard law policies to be imposed upon countries in 
the larger interest of the community, the Europeanization norms were useful in 
pressuring countries to voluntarily implement soft law provisions. 
Haze mitigation efforts in ASEAN
Li�e acid rain in the EU, transboundary haze is a serious environmental 
problem in Southeast Asia. Unli�e acid rain, haze persists to this day. ‘Haze’ 
66	 	Levy,	“Acid	Rain	in	Europe”,	p.	43
67	 	Pallemaerts,	“Law”,	p.	42,	Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	Regional	Haze	in	
Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
68	 	Levy,	“Acid	Rain	in	Europe”,	p.	43
69  Brachtl, M. V. 2004. ‘Capitalizing on the Success of the Long-Range �ransboundary 
Air Pollution (LR�AP) Regime to Address Global �ransboundary Air Pollution.’ 14. Program of 
Negotiation at Harvard Law School.
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is	a	term	used	in	the	Southeast	Asian	region	to	refer	to	‘sufficient	smoke,	dust,	
moisture, and vapour suspended in air to impair visibility’. Haze pollution is 
transboundary when ‘its density and extent is so great at the source that it 
remains at measureable levels after crossing into another country’s airspace’70. 
�he Southeast Asian haze is now commonly understood to be mainly caused 
by	smoke	 from	grass,	 forest	and	peat	fires71, mainly from Indonesia, and to 
a lesser extent, Malaysia. It affects the health of some 75 million people and 
the economy of six Southeast Asian nations; Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Brunei Darussalam, �hailand, and the Philippines72. �ransboundary haze 
has been an annual recurring problem in Southeast Asia since the 1980s. �he 
region experienced its worst bout with the haze from 1997 to 1998, and another 
serious episode descended upon the region in 200673. �he haze is the region’s 
first,	and	most	publicly-identifiable	regional	environmental	crisis74, with many 
governments declaring repeated ‘emergencies’ during serious haze episodes75. 
�his section details the efforts underta�en by ASEAN to curb haze in the 
region.
ASEAN regional-level action over the haze began in 1985, with 
the adoption of the Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources,	which	made	 specific	 reference	 to	air	pollution	and	 ‘transfrontier	
environmental effects’. �his was followed over the years by other agreements 
with references to transboundary pollution, li�e the 1990 Kuala Lumpur 
Accord on Environment and Development and the 1992 Singapore Resolution 
on Environment and Development76. Indeed, the 1992 Singapore Declaration 
identified	such	transboundary	pollution	as	a	major	environmental	concern.	In	
the same year, ASEAN environmental ministers agreed to harmonize policy 
directions and establish operational and technical cooperation, with special 
reference to haze77.	The	first	Workshop	on	Transboundary	Pollution	and	Haze	
70  ASEAN Secretariat 2008. ‘Information on Fire and Haze.’ In E. Division (Ed.) HazeO-
nline. Ja�arta: ASEAN Secretariat.
71	 	Cotton,	J.	1999.	‘The	“haze”	over	Southeast	Asia:	Challenging	the	ASEAN	mode	of	
regional engagement.’ Pacific Affairs, 72:3, 331-51.
72  Mayer, J. 2006. ‘�ransboundary Perspectives on Managing Indonesia’s Fires.’ The 
Journal of Environment & Development, 15:2, 202-33.
73  Suwarsono, Roswiniarti, O., Noviar, H., Albar, I., Phone�eo, C. J. S. B. V. & Song, Y. 
2007.	‘Influence	of	climate	variation	and	vegetation	greenness	on	fire	occurence:	A	case	study	in	
Central Kalimantan province.’ Ja�arta: Indonesian National Institute of Aeronautics and Space and 
Geoinformatics Center - Asian Institute of �echnology, Saleh, K. 2006. ‘Haze fund on hold until 
ratification.’	Jakarta Post. Ja�arta.
74  Elliott, L. 2003. ‘ASEAN and environmental cooperation: norms, interests and iden-
tity.’ The Pacific Review, 16:1, 29-52`, Severino, R. F. 1999. ‘Fighting the Haze: A Regional and 
Global Responsibility.’ Final Regional Workshop of the Regional Technical Assistance Project on 
Strengthening ASEAN’s Capacity to Prevent and Mitigate Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution: 
3. Ja�arta: ASEAN Secretariat.
75	 	Mayer,	“Transboundary	Perspectives	on	Managing	Indonesia’s	Fires”,	pp.	202-233
76  ASEAN Secretariat 1995. ‘ASEAN Meeting on the Management of �ransboundary 
Pollution.’ Kuala Lumpur.
77  �ay, S. 2008. ‘Blowing Smo�e: Regional cooperation, Indonesian Democracy, and the 
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in ASEAN Countries was held in Bali�papan, Indonesia in September 1992, 
specifically	addressing	the	haze	as	an	individual	problem	in	the	region78. �he 
first	 informal	ASEAN	Ministerial	Meeting	on	 the	Environment	 in	Kuching,	
Sarawa� in 1994 mar�ed the beginnings of a more visible effort by the ASEAN 
member countries to address recurring haze problem. Here the ministers agreed 
to enhance cooperation to manage natural resources and control transboundary 
pollution within ASEAN, develop an early warning and response system, and 
to improve the capacity of member countries in these areas79. 
In 1995, as a follow up to this meeting, the ASEAN	Senior	Officials	
on the Environment established a Haze �echnical �as� Force (H��F) with 
the objective of putting into operation the measures included in the 1995 
ASEAN Cooperation Plan on �ransboundary Pollution80. �he plan set out 
the broad policies and strategies to deal with atmospheric and other forms of 
transboundary pollution. It outlined the efforts to be made at both national and 
regional levels to deal with the haze81. �he Ministers also agreed to develop 
a	common	air-quality	 index	and	a	 regional	fire-danger	 rating	 system82. �his 
proposal was subsequently adopted by ASEAN83. Member states also agreed to 
share	knowledge	and	technology	on	the	prevention	and	mitigation	of	forest	fires,	
and	to	establish	a	mechanism	for	cooperation	in	combating	forest	fires84. �his 
plan, however, was much less formal or binding than comparable documents in 
other regions such as Europe for curbing transboundary harm85. It was largely a 
listing of general actions that governments ought to ta�e to prevent and mitigate 
forest	fires86.	The	absence	of	specific	operational	directives	rendered	the	plan	
ineffective, and member countries were again thrown into crisis-management 
mode with the advent of the most serious haze problem of the region in 199787. 
�he ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze in 1997 formulated a 
Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) under the H��F to provide further 
haze.’ In D. K. Emmerson (Ed.) Hard Choices. Singapore: ISEAS.
78  ASEAN Secretariat 1995. ‘ASEAN Meeting on the Management of �ransboundary 
Pollution.’ Kuala Lumpur.
79  Yahaya, N. 2000. ‘�ransboundary Air Pollution: Haze Pollution in Southeast Asia and 
its	Significance.’	Journal of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations, 2:2, 41-50.
80  Severino, R. C. 2006. Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights 
from the former ASEAN Secretary-General. Singapore: ISEAS.
81  Tay,	S.	S.	C.	1998.	‘South	East	Asian	forest	fires:	haze	over	ASEAN	and	international	
environmental law.’ Reciel, 7:2, 202-08.
82  �ay, S. S. C. 2002. ‘Fires and Haze in Southeast Asia.’ In P. J. Noda (Ed.) Cross-
Sectoral Partnerships in Enhancing Human Security: 53-80. �o�yo: Japan Center for International 
Exchange.
83 The Straits Times 1995. ‘Haze alert for ASEAN countries tried successfully.’ The 
Straits Times. Singapore..
84	 	Tay.	‘South	East	Asian	forest	fires’	pp.	202-28
85  �ay. ‘Blowing Smo�e’ pp. 53-80
86  Severino. ‘Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community’
87  �ay. ‘Blowing Smo�e’ pp. 53-80
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commitments and details to the Cooperation plan88. It was a soft-law, non-
binding instrument which stood on three pillars: the spirit of voluntarism, 
the	no-fault	finding	 rule,	 and	 the	offer	of	 assistance	based	on	expertise	 and	
capability89.	The	plan	was	divided	into	three	parts.	The	first	required	member	
states to draw up national plans based on the regional plan. �he second sought 
to	 strengthen	 the	 monitoring	 and	 anticipation	 of	 forest	 fires	 and	 increased	
pollution levels through the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center 
(ASMC).	The	third	focused	upon	the	enhancement	of	fire	fighting	capability90. 
It also established an ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning. �hese guidelines for 
zero burning, however, were not meant to be prescriptive and controlled 
burning	 continued	 to	 be	 allowed	 for	 ‘specific	 situations’91. �he primary 
emphasis of the RHAP continued to be on national plans and capabilities92. �he 
RHAP	exemplified	a	‘soft	 law’	approach	and	was	also	not	a	 legally	binding	
agreement93. It was left to the governments concerned to decide what was to 
be included in their national plans, with the freedom to bypass or equivocate 
on matters raised in the RHAP94. �here were no mechanisms under the plan 
for	any	member	country	 to	ensure	 that	 the	other	member	countries	 fulfilled	
their obligations95. As a result, the RHAP generated a massive amount of 
information on the haze96  but not much else. 
The	RHAP,	however,	did	establish	a	procedure	by	which	fire	fighting	
resources	could	be	pooled	for	regional	fire-fighting	operations97. Furthermore, 
it	 solidified	 the	 breakdown	 in	 haze	 mitigation	 roles	 at	 the	 ASEAN	 level	
according to the country’s expertise: Malaysia for prevention, Singapore for 
monitoring	and	Indonesia	for	firefighting98. �he RHAP also enlisted the Asian 
Development Ban� (ADB) as a consultant in support of implementation99. 
88  Evans, J. W. 2001. ‘Fire, Smo�e and Haze: �he ASEAN Response Strategy.’ In S. �. 
Qadri (Ed.) 6. Philippines: Asian Development Ban�. Yahaya. ‘�ransboundary Air Pollution’ pp. 
41-50
89  Florano, E. R. 2004. ‘Regional Environmental Cooperation without �ears or Fear: �he 
Case of the Asean Regional Haze Action Plan.’ Paper presented at International Environmental 
Governance Conference. 15 & 16 March 2004.
90  Jones, D. S. 2006. ‘ASEAN and transboundary haze pollution in Southeast Asia.’ Asia 
Europa Journal, 4:3.
91  ASEAN Secretariat 2003. ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of the ASEAN Policy 
on Zero Burning.’ Ja�arta: ASEAN.
92	 	Tay.	‘South	East	Asian	forest	fires’	pp.	202-28
93  �ay. ‘Blowing Smo�e’ pp. 53-80
94  Jones, D. S. 2006. ‘ASEAN and transboundary haze pollution in Southeast Asia.’ Asia 
Europa Journal, 4:3.
95  Parliament	 of	 Singapore	 1998.	 ‘ASEAN	Region	Haze	Action	 Plan	 (Fulfillment	 of	
Obligations) (1998-01-15).’ Singapore.
96	 	Severino.	“Fighting	the	Haze” 
97  �ay. ‘Blowing Smo�e’ pp. 53-80
98  Woon, S. L. 2002. ‘Monitoring and remote sensing in ASEAN: ASMC’s role, ca-
pacities and activities in relation to ASEAN’s regional haze action plan.’ Paper presented at World 
Land & Forest Fire Hazards. Yahaya. ‘�ransboundary Air Pollution’ pp. 41-50
99  �ay. ‘Blowing Smo�e’ pp. 53-80
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A USD 1 million grant was provided by the ADB to ASEAN as Regional 
�echnical Assistance (RE�A) for strengthening ASEAN’s capacity in 
preventing and mitigating the transboundary pollution100. �he project brought 
in two international consultants, and the project’s staff was later permanently 
institutionalised into the ASEAN secretariat. One of the activities developed 
from the RE�A is the ASEAN HazeOnline website (http:��www.haze-online.
or.id) which has improved the availability of timely meteorological information 
and details101. 
In 1998, the ASEAN Summit in Vietnam issued the Hanoi Plan of 
Action that called for the full implementation of the RHAP by 2001. �hat year, 
the H��F agreed to establish two Sub-Regional Fire-Fighting Arrangements 
(SRFA) for Borneo and the Sumatra�Riau provinces in Indonesia under the 
RHAP to facilitate the movement of resources from one member country to 
the other102. �o complement the SRFA, a SRFA Legal Group was established 
in 2000 to examine the legal and enforcement issues related to curbing forest 
fires103.  On top of these plans and agreements, other ASEAN initiatives on 
the haze include detailed operational procedures for monitoring, assessment 
and joint emergency response; the formation of a regional networ� made up 
of	national	 focal	points;	 an	 inventory	of	fire-fighting	 resources	 and	 training	
mechanisms; simulation exercises for joint emergency response between 
countries;	 demonstration	 sites	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 farmers,	 smallholders	 and	
shifting cultivators; and an ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative. �he 
current stage of ASEAN cooperation over the haze stands at the implementation 
of the ASEAN Agreement on �ransboundary Haze Pollution (A�HP), which 
was brought into force in 2003104.	 This	 agreement	 has	 been	 ratified	 by	 all	
ASEAN member states save Indonesia105, where the agreement continues to 
face	barriers	to	ratification	at	the	parliamentary	level.	
Discussion: Applying the CLRTAP/CAFE model to ASEAN?
�he frequency and visibility of ASEAN haze mitigation projects, 
seemingly without any permanent effects on the haze situation, has led many 
scholars to argue that ASEAN as a regional organization that is supposed to 
promote and foster cooperation of its member states towards the common 
good, has failed in this endeavour. Because of this, many scholars have pointed 
towards the successes of acid rain mitigation in Europe, and suggested that the 
100  Chang, L. L. & Rajan, R. S. 2001. ‘Regional Versus Multilateral Solutions to �rans-
boundary Environmental Problems: Insights from the Southeast Asian Haze.’ Transboundary En-
vironmental Problems in Asia, 655-70.
101  Chang & Rajan. ‘Regional Versus Multilateral Solutions to �ransboundary Environ-
mental Problems’ pp. 655-70
102  Ibid. 
103  Jones. ‘ASEAN and transboundary haze pollution in Southeast Asia’
104  ASEAN Secretariat 2004. ‘4: �ransnational Issues.’ ASEAN Annual Report. ASEAN.
105  ASEAN Secretariat. ‘ASEAN Meeting on the Management of �ransboundary Pollu-
tion’
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European model be applied to improve the haze mitigation initiatives under 
ASEAN. However, this paper argues against this, stating that due to the very 
different nature of the EU and ASEAN communities, these suggestions are not 
feasible. �his argument is elaborated in the following sections. 
First, this section discusses the various arguments by ASEAN scholars 
that encourage the application of Europe’s acid rain model to haze issues in 
ASEAN. Karim106 describes the CLR�AP as an encouraging example for 
ASEAN and haze issues, as ASEAN nations can learn from the experience of 
the Convention. He points out the modus operandi with the acid rain framewor� 
where, in order to bring all the necessary players to the table, the CLR�AP 
initially �ic�ed off with somewhat soft legal commitments. However, in the 
long run, the EU successfully established an effective legal framewor� for 
transboundary pollution management. He thus argues that in this way, ASEAN 
should be able to develop an effective legal framewor� within the A�HP as 
well. He argues that as the provisions of the A�HP are more or less similar to 
the CLR�AP, there is hope for the A�HP if it further continues down Europe’s 
path. Simon �ay107 agrees with this too. He states that since the CLR�AP and 
its protocols have been effective, treaties li�e the A�HP which also emphasize 
collective	 action	 without	 liability	 or	 setting	 specific	 limits	 have	 no	 excuse	
for being ineffective. Florano108 even notes that haze management should be 
even easier in ASEAN because compared to acid deposition in Europe whose 
pollutants easily mix together while being transported by air, the exact location 
of	 fires	 or	 ‘hotspots’	 and	 ‘smoke	 plumes’	 could	 be	 easily	 detected	 through	
technology available at the ASMC.  
Florano109, Syarif110 and �a�ahashi111	provide	specific	examples	where	
the ASEAN mechanism can be adopted along the lines of the EU model. In 2003, 
Florano examined the contents of the 1997 ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan 
(RHAP) and compared it with the CLR�AP. Using Pamela Chase�’s ‘Strength 
Index’, it was discovered that both agreements shared soft-law characteristics. 
For example, there are no provisions that allow the secretariats to monitor 
state compliance, there are no mechanisms to deal with non-compliance, the 
106  Karim, M. S. 2008. ‘Future of the Haze Agreement: Is the Glass Half Empty or Half 
Full?’ Environmental Policy and Law, 38:6.
107  �ay, S. S. C. 2001. ‘Fires, Haze and Acid Rain: �he Social and Political Framewor� of 
Air Pollution in ASEAN and Asia.’ Paper presented at Challenges of a Changing Earth: Proceed-
ings of the Global Change Open Science Conference.
108  Florano, E. R. 2004. ‘Regional Environmental Cooperation without �ears or Fear: �he 
Case of the Asean Regional Haze Action Plan.’ Paper presented at International Environmental 
Governance Conference. 15 & 16 March 2004.
109	 	Ibid,	Florano,	E.	R.	2003.	‘Asssesment	of	the	“Strengths”	of	the	New	ASEAN	Agree-
ment on �ransboundary Haze Pollution.’ International Review for Environmental Strategies, 4:1, 
127-47. 
110  Syarif, L. O. M. 2007. ‘Regional arrangements for transboundary atmospheric pollu-
tion in ASEAN countries.’ Faculty of Law. Sydney: University of Sydney.
111  �a�ahashi, W. 2004. ‘Environmental Cooperation in Northeast Asia.’ Japan: Institute 
for Global Environmental Strategies.
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secretariats	do	not	have	authority	 to	conduct	field	 inspections,	and	there	are	
no liability provisions against errant parties. Interestingly, Florano observes 
that the A�HP appears, in theory, to be stronger than the CLR�AP. �his was 
because in contrast to the CLR�AP, the A�HP does not allow parties to ma�e 
reservations to provisions in the Agreement, it can be amended through the 
Conference of Parties, it has procedural performance standard guidelines, and 
it	has	clearly	identified	possible	financial	sources	and	mechanisms.	In	turn,	the	
A�HP obtained no scores in those indices that could have given its Secretariat 
the power to monitor or inspect the compliance of members and to mete out 
punishment to stubborn ones. However, the great strength of the CLR�AP 
is in its provisions for additional protocols. It made extensive use of the 
‘convention-multiple	protocols’	approach	to	flesh	out	the	broader	provisions	
of the Convention112,	including	most	of	the	weaknesses	specified	by	Florano.	
While the A�HP allows for additional protocols and amendments, this has not 
been successfully implemented to date. �his is largely because of ASEAN’s 
consensus	 norm,	 which	 makes	 it	 extremely	 difficult	 for	 new	 protocols	 to	
be adopted. For all these reasons, Florano concludes that the A�HP can be 
branded as a ‘blind and toothless paper tiger’113. 
Syarif, in his 2007 doctoral thesis dedicates an entire chapter 
comparatively evaluating ASEAN haze management with air pollution 
policies in Europe. He proposes the EU model as a possible model for future 
ASEAN environmental cooperation, both generally and on haze issues 
in particular. He argues that the rule of law approach as used by Europe is 
necessary	in	addressing	environmental	issues	like	the	haze.	He	identifies	three	
success factors in the EU in creating a strong base for environmental regional 
cooperation:	the	willingness	of	member	states’	leaders	to	‘sacrifice’	some	of	
their national sovereignty for the sa�e of the community, the structure and 
decision-ma�ing process of the EU, and the existence of a supra-national body 
that can force member states to enforce community laws and policies. Syarif 
notes that progressive measures ta�en by EU on acid rain were partly due to the 
external	pressure	brought	by	the	ratification	of	the	CLRTAP,	particularly	from	
the UN-ECE. He also notes that the adoption of some hard-law instruments 
like	official	Directives	on	ambient	air	quality	standards,	something	which	is	
absent in ASEAN, was an important factor in acid rain mitigation there114. As 
discussed in the previous section, this is because it is more unli�ely in ASEAN 
for countries to give up parts of their sovereignty. 
�a�ahashi115	agrees	with	Syarif	on	the	importance	of	official	Directives	
to encourage member states to comply with the CLR�AP. He also points out that 
112	 	Florano,	“Regional	Environmental	Cooperation	Without	Tears	or	Fear”,	pp.	136-139
113	 	Florano,	“Assessment	of	 the	“Strengths”	of	 the	New	ASEAN	Agreement	on	Trans-
boundary	Haze	Pollution”,	pp.	127-147
114  Syarif, “Regional arrangements for transboundary atmospheric pollution in ASEAN 
Countries”,	,	pp.	424-425
115	 	Takahashi,	“Enviromental	Cooperation	in	Northeast	Asia”,	p.	16
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the	EU’s	existing	financial	and	technology	transfer	mechanisms	have	official	
and	unofficial	links	with	the	CLRTAP,	which	made	it	easier	for	compliance	as	
well. Additionally, he describes the contribution of the UN-ECE in facilitating 
and coordinating secretariat services to its member states with Convention 
matters. He notes that in comparison, ASEAN did not create a strong central 
bureaucracy and merely provided minimal and largely administrative support 
to its members through the ASEAN secretariat. 
�he suggestions coming from scholars about how ASEAN and its anti-
haze regime could be improved along the lines of Europe’s acid rain experience 
can be deduced into four broad proposals: (1) �he ASEAN Secretariat should 
be shaped into a strong central bureaucracy with the powers to monitor or 
inspect the compliance of members and to mete out punishment to stubborn 
ones116.	(2)	ASEAN	should	adopt	hard-law	instruments	like	official	Directives	
on ambient air quality standards to encourage member states to comply with the 
A�HP provisions117. (3) �he A�HP should enforce its provisions for additional 
protocols	to	flesh	out	the	broader	provisions	of	the	convention118. (4) ASEAN 
should	adopt	financial	and	technology	transfer	mechanisms	that	are	officially	
tied to the A�HP, which will help states which do not have the capacity to 
comply with A�HP provisions119.
The	 first	 and	 second	 proposals	 have	 been	 partially	 adopted	 into	
ASEAN,	 but	 face	 difficulties	 in	 implementation	 given	 the	 organization’s	
institutional design. For example, ASEAN does have a standing ‘Panel of 
Experts’ that are supposed to be immediately dispatched to burning areas when 
fire	and	haze	events	occur,	to	inspect	the	damage	and	recommend	solutions.	
However, Indonesia has on several occasions bloc�ed entry of these experts by 
invo�ing the norms of non-interference and sovereignty. In situations such as 
this, Indonesia is often accused of protecting the interests of big agribusiness 
players	 as	 they	 do	 not	 want	 the	 experts	 to	 see	 that	 fires	 are	 occurring	 on	
commercial agricultural land. 
�he third proposal is problematic as well. While the A�HP does allow 
for additional protocols, the consensus basis upon which ASEAN conducts 
itself	 has	made	 it	 extremely	 difficult	 for	 new	 protocols	 to	 be	 adopted.	 For	
example, Indonesia has been ma�ing demands for protocols on illegal logging 
to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 ATHP	 as	 a	 condition	 for	 its	 ratification.	 However,	
Malaysia, whose interests will be implicated in an illegal logging protocol, 
insists	 that	 Indonesia	 should	 ratify	 the	 treaty	 first,	 before	 the	 protocol	 is	
included,	as	there	is	no	guarantee	of	Indonesian	ratification	with	or	without	the	
protocol. Episodes such as this have resulted in a stalemate over the universal 
adoption of the A�HP. 
116	 	Florano,	“Regional	Environmental	Cooperation	Without	Tears	or	Fear”,	pp.	136-139
117  Syarif, “Regional arrangements for transboundary atmospheric pollution in ASEAN 
countries”,	p.	425,	Takahashi,	“Environmental	Cooperation	in	Northeast	Asia”,	p.	16
118	 	Florano,	“Regional	Environmental	Cooperation	Without	Tears	or	Fear”,	pp.	136-139
119  Takahashi,	“Environmental	Cooperation	in	Northeast	Asia”,	p.	16
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�he fourth proposal has already been adopted under the A�HP, but 
with less successful results. As part of the A�HP, a Haze Fund was established 
as	a	financial	assistance	mechanism.	However,	 this	mechanism	has	suffered	
from the lowest-common-denominator problem where, due to the different 
levels of economic development in the region, contributions to the fund 
was set at an equal, but very low amount of USD50,000 per country. �his 
a small amount, and does not even come close to the estimated projections 
needed by Indonesia for effective mitigation on the ground. �echnology 
transfer mechanisms are also in place; however these programmes often run 
into problems on the ground. For example, Malaysia sponsored an air quality 
monitoring	station	to	be	constructed	at	a	fire-prone	area	in	Indonesia.	Despite	
receiving approval from central authorities, the shipment was retained at 
the customs until a substantial bribe was paid for its release. �his indicates 
governance problems on the ground. 
Certain scholars have ac�nowledged these limitations, among others. 
For example, Syarif does ac�nowledge that the EU-based model that he 
proposed	in	his	thesis	may	not	reflect	the	current	political	reality	of	the	ASEAN	
region. He also considers that it may not be fully applicable due to different 
environmental problems and levels of economic development120. Some scholars 
further note that the acid rain addressed by the CLR�AP is caused by industrial 
emissions which can be controlled by abatement technologies, unli�e the haze 
which has its roots in low-technology agriculture121. Others also admit that in a 
normative	situation	such	as	ASEAN	where	sanctions	are	difficult	to	apply,	the	
success of the A�HP (even an updated one along the lines of the CLR�AP) will 
still be largely dependent on individual country’s (Indonesian) participation, 
not collective regional action122. 
�he above discussions shows that while both the EU and ASEAN 
approaches to transboundary pollution are in some ways similar, they also 
display important differences. Firstly, while in both cases a commission or 
secretariat has been assigned to oversee the implementation of mitigation 
activities, the effectiveness of these secretariats have differed widely. In the 
EU, once consensus was reached over the CLR�AP, all follow thorough were 
ta�en by the commission. �his pooling of sovereignty at the commission level 
has made it easier to monitor compliance and implement policy. In contrast, in 
ASEAN, sovereignty remains with the states at all times and all decisions are 
still ta�en on a consensus basis, leaving the secretariat relatively powerless. 
Secondly, despite both regional approaches consisting of largely soft-
law, lowest-common-denominator agreements, these agreements were adhered 
to more closely by European states compared to Southeast Asian states. �his 
120  Syarif, “Regional arrangements for transboundary atmospheric pollution in ASEAN 
Countries”,	,	pp.	424-425
121	 	Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	Regional	Haze	in	Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
122	 	Karim,	“Future	of	the	Haze	Agreement”,	p.	331,Eaton	&	Radojevic,	“Forest	Fires	and	
Regional	Haze	in	Southeast	Asia”,	p.	336
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can be attributed to the strong feeling of community among the European 
states, giving rise to collective pressure to adhere to standards and agreements 
in the larger interest of the community. In contrast, ASEAN agreements were 
largely not adhered to by member states, with states largely prioritizing their 
own national interests above the interests of the community. In this analysis, 
the differing views of sovereignty and national versus collective interests 
were an important factor in the success or failure of transboundary pollution 
initiatives in the EU and ASEAN. 
�herefore, while good intentioned suggestions for improvements 
should not be dismissed, this paper rejects that mere changes at the ASEAN level 
along	these	suggested	lines	would	be	sufficient	in	conclusive	haze	abatement.	
As a result, unli�e the EU initiatives that were successful in bringing acid 
rain levels down to manageable levels within a decade, haze continues to be a 
recurring problem in the Southeast Asian region. After a brief respite in 2008 
due to favourable El Niño weather conditions that limited the travel of smo�e, 
the haze returned to blan�et the region in July 2009123, October 2010124, and 
July 2011125, triggering drastic drops in air quality in certain areas in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore126. 
Conclusion
As this paper has made clear, ASEAN is by design a very different 
type of institution from the EU. �he EU’s successes in acid rain abatement can 
be	accounted	for	by	three	region-specific	factors:	the	willingness	of	member	
states’	leaders	to	‘sacrifice’	some	of	their	national	sovereignty	for	the	sake	of	
the community, the structure and decision-ma�ing process of the EU, and the 
existence of a supra-national body that can force member states to enforce 
community laws and policies127. As detailed above, ASEAN by design does 
not possess these characteristics. �herefore, this paper argues that focus in the 
scholarship on regional-level solutions to the Southeast Asian haze, especially 
in the image of EU solutions for acid rain, has been misguided. From this 
analysis, it can be concluded that ASEAN can, and does, play a role in haze 
management, but only within its institutional limitations. �he successes and 
failures of transboundary haze management in Southeast Asia do not depend 
solely, or even mainly, on regional action. Scholarship should focus on other 
avenues for possible solutions, li�e pressure from civil society grassroots and 
the international community, or business-focused approaches.  
123  �hen, S. 2009. ‘Asean braces for the haze... yet again.’ The Star. Kuala Lumpur.
124  Simamora, A. P. & Adamrah, M. 2010. ‘Govt says haze from RI, blames traditional 
farmers.’ Jakarta Post. Ja�arta.
125  Kutty, R. R. 2011. ‘Need to wal� the tal�.’ The Star. Kuala Lumpur.
126  Lee, Y. P. & Chan, L. L. 2009. ‘�he haze is bac�.’ Ibid, �hen, S., Wong, J. & Chiew, 
H. 2009. ‘�hic� haze in many parts of Sarawa�.’ The Star. Kuala Lumpur.
127  Syarif, “Regional arrangements for transboundary atmospheric pollution in ASEAN 
countries”,	p.	425
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However, in defence of ASEAN, its former Secretary-General, 
Rodolfo Severino128 insisted that “ASEAN has to be measured against the 
purposes that is has set for itself and the limitation that it has imposed upon 
itself	...	not	against	the	wishes	or	expectations	of	others”.	ASEAN	was	never	
intended to be a supranational body of functional integration in the same 
manner as the EU129. It has been argued that as long as ASEAN remains a 
group	of	 sovereign	states,	non-interference	 is	 the	principle	 that	best	 reflects	
this condition130. �he original charter of ASEAN spo�e of economic and social 
cooperation131, which ASEAN has arguably helped develop. �he process-
based nature of ASEAN and its person-to-person dialogue have allowed a slow 
evolution of a regional agenda where no consensus had existed previously. �he 
loose wordings of ASEAN documents can be viewed as having a ‘strategic 
ambiguity’ to encourage states to sign on, while allowing for a policy gap in 
which new means and tools can be created to meet the needs of the evolving 
ASEAN community132. ASEAN is useful in these ways, but less so in haze 
mitigation. 
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